Why not use another spatial metaphor to talk about the “distance”
(close vs. far, etc.) of reading? I’d like to meditate further on the concept
of positionality that Sedgwick attributes to Melanie Klein and Silvan Tomkins.
Sedgwick prefers to think about reader/text object relations through the concept
of positions rather than through concepts of “order stages, stable structures”
(Sedgwick 128) or established
practice types because positionality encourages us to think about the
flexibility of movement between reader and text object positions. She points
out that the reader and text often stand in “changing and heterogeneous
relational stances” (128).
In this post, I want to think more about how we might be
able to frame Sedgwick, Warner, Armstrong, and Moretti within the concept of
positionality in order to better understand them as offering reading practices
among which we can move to-and-fro. I want to look at their reading practices
not as discrete, stable programs but as different critical and relational
positions—often fragmenting, contradictory, and overlapping—that offer
different sets of reader/text object relations from which to read.
I realize this is pretty ambitious, so I’ll try to focus this on a problem that
Moretti raises. He points out that “the trouble with close reading…is that it
necessarily depends on an extremely small canon. This may have become an
unconscious and invisible premiss [premise] (apparently premiss is an
alternative spelling of premise. Who knew?!) by now, but it is an iron one
nonetheless: you invest so much in individual texts only if you think that very
few of them matter” (Moretti 57). Moretti is highlighting the problem of
canonization to close reading. The very selection of a text to close read may
involve invisible (or not so invisible) processes of exclusion and hierarchies
of value. He argues that the advantage of his “distant reading” program is that
it subverts national historiography, which often involves the selection of
Important Events to the exclusion of others in creating national historical
narratives. In other words, national historiography involves a process of canonization
and the creation of hierarchies of importance built for and by the dominant
political, cultural, and economic elite. Therefore, close reading may, in some
instances, be complicit in canon-forming and national historiography. According
to Moretti, “distant reading” avoids that complicity.
I’m less interested in whether or not his particular
solution works to resolve this problem more in how we might move between the
different reading practices to respond to his challenge. Let’s start with
Moretti, why not. “Distant reading” avoids the problem of canonization by
disabling the reader’s ability to select and interpret the text in the first
place. The distant reader does not prioritize any one text over another. Every text
has the same value in relation to another: whether or not it confirms whatever
the distant reader is testing for—be it for certain metaphors, or tropes, or
systemic patterns. Therefore, the distant reader’s relation to the text is one
of verification rather than of interpretation (so integral to close reading).
That’s certainly one way to avoid the problem of canon, but Moretti admittedly
points out that it’s a “reading without freedom,” where the reader is compelled
to follow her verification method (Moretti 61).
We may move positions into Warner to talk more about canon.
He may identify the problem of canonization in the tendency of critical reading
practices to “self-select” works that are already available to its critique. He
makes use of Cavallo and Chartier’s example of the library of Alexandria to
clarify this tendency (Warner 21). The library’s ambition was to collect works
from all over the world and across history, and to categorize them by type,
author, content, etc., reflecting the library’s values of universality and
rationality in its selection criteria. However, these values limited the works
that could be collected to those that could only be evaluated by universality
and rationality. So, we might say that the values of the critical reading
practice, in the same way, limit the works that it reads to only works that can
be evaluated by critical reading practices. If these practices are as
privileged as Warner argues, the canon, guided by the reader, becomes full of
texts available only to these reading practices to the exclusion of other ways
of reading. To avoid this problem, Warner argues that we de-familiarize or
de-naturalize critical reading as the only way to read, that we understand it
as a practice that has its own set of historically specific norms and
text-making and assumes a specific kind of subjectivity and agency. He
advocates for overturning the critical/uncritical binary that critical reading
produces and for considering practices previously deemed “uncritical” as
rational, with its own, perhaps competing, set of norms, text-making and
subjectivity. In this way, critical reading becomes decentered as the
privileged reading practice and allows for other reading practices to read and
select texts.
I’ll end with a question for you all because this is already
getting too long and too ambitious to really start to explore how we, as
readers, might move “to-and-fro” from different reader/text object positions.
Maybe you can help me out or maybe it isn’t possible to adopt the concept of
positions to start building bridges and connections between these papers. Or maybe, I'm completely misunderstanding the concept and it doesn't apply at all! In that case, let's just say I'm interested in how each paper responds to and attempts to resolve the problem of canonization. I
promise my next blog post will be more specific and concrete.
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