A major part of Hayot’s
analysis of Greenblatt’s use of anecdote is the uncovering of historical
background that was absent from Greenblatt’s framing of the text. Whether this
context was left off intentionally or otherwise, in removing part of Scott’s
account from context the interpretation of the text was significantly altered.
Both theorists appear to agree on the importance of truth and accuracy.
Greenblatt remarks that the categories of fiction and non-fiction “fundamentally
alters our mode of reading texts and changes our ethical position towards them”
(15). Meanwhile Hayot’s fight to recover the original context implies that in
order to fully understand a work it must be properly contextualized.
The tension between
the two articles raises several important questions about non-fictionality,
genre, and context. Foremost, it becomes clear that non-fiction is not easily
defined. All non-fiction accounts are mediated. Greenblatt points out the
circumstances under which Exact Discourse
was written may have led Scott to embellish (11). Hayot adds the fact that
cultural stereotypes regarding the passive stoicism of the Chinese and a desire
to create a certain image of England were both at play in shaping both the
narrative and Greenblatt’s interpretation (46). It becomes hard to pick fact
from fiction, or even to determine at what point in the mixing of the two an
account stops being considered non-fiction. The genre distinction between
fiction and non-fiction is held to be vitally important but is, in fact, not particularly
well defined.
More so, early in his
essay Greenblatt mentions the textuality of history. As was mentioned in last
week’s readings, history is neither unmediated nor continuous. There is no
single, complete, correct account of it, and much of what is known is colored
by different layers of interpretation and embellishment, past and present. This
suggest that the historical context of the work, while important, is also
subject to question. If historical accuracy is the measure of a work’s
non-fictionality, the genre would be farther destabilized by the notion that
history is—and will necessarily remain—somewhat obscure.
Non-fiction is given
weight because it refers to a real event. According to Hayot, “As a ‘narrative
form’ specifically dedicated to the real, the anecdote binds story to history”(40).
But when both the event and the soundness of the reference is called into
question, it becomes unclear how much the non-fictionality of a text should color
our reading. To what extent should Scott’s real cruelty be held as a stronger example
than, say, the blinding of Gloucester in King
Lear—a fabricated act that has persisted in Western cultural consciousness
because it refers to a more generalized form of human cruelty, and which
Greenblatt notably mentions as a fictional counterpoint to the events of Exact Discourse(14)?
If we are to
distinguish between fiction and non-fiction, there is also the matter of texts
which cannot be classed as either. Some accounts are mislabeled. Some are separated
from their context, or may not be able to be located in history. Even when
speaking of Scott’s Exact Discourse, Greenblatt
asks, “How can we be certain that what Scott reports in the passage I have quoted
actually took place?” and immediately responds that, “The answer is we cannot”
(14). If historicization and genre distinctions play an important part in our
understanding of a text, what happens when one or both of these things aren’t
possible? Can the text still be interpreted in any meaningful capacity?
I was also struck by
the way that Hayot’s style of analysis seemed to imply that, by zooming out and
viewing the passage in a fuller context, he was able to interpret it more
accurately. Yet given both the limited space allotted for historicization in
the essay and the idea of history’s inherent obscurity, there is no doubt a
third, more encompassing view of the text that explains it more accurately
still, and a fourth after that. In fact, it seems possible to zoom out
infinitely, until all excerpts are held as misleading and the only way to fully
understand a work is as a part of the entire text and as a product of its exact
historical moment. To what extent can a passage be understood when removed from
the entire text? And while the idea that a text can only be fully described by
itself is philosophically interesting, is it practical?
As an (unrelated) end note,
I wanted to remark on when Greenblatt says that "runs the risk of losing
the dark specificity of that account, the risk of absorbing the unspeakable but
spoken rupture of human relatedness into an abstract, prepackaged schema."
Last week, I found myself deeply skeptical of Jamison and Althusser’s
attachment to Marxism as a master theory, even though they claimed to have
consistent, rational arguments to support their line of thinking. In this line
Greenblatt perfectly articulated exactly why their adulation of Marxism was so
suspect—not just that it can become reductive, but also in the idea that the
schema is prepackaged. That is to say, Marxism may be able to adequately
interpret a text but because Marxist theorists aim to analyze things through
one particular predetermined lens, there is no guarantee that particular lens
will give the most comprehensive view of the text and may end up missing some
of the nuances. It would not be wrong to frame the interaction between Scott
and the goldsmith in terms of economics and class, but to do so would blunt the
edges of Scott’s cruelty and remove much of the humanity.
You raise some interesting questions about textuality, genre, and Truth (with a capital T), Leanna, and you do so in a really lucid way. In particular, I found your question about how we make sense of textual meaning through historicization and genre classification to be resonant with some questions I've been grappling with.
ReplyDeleteI think Spivak may provide an answer in her "rhetorically-sensitive" reading practice. If we read "literature-as-literature" that has a "singular rhetoricity" we may be able to find a entry point for a critique of History (in the sense that Jameson or Althusser conceive of it). We may not agree on whether her reading practice succeeds or not (I'm undecided), but we can probably agree that her project, to leave open sites of ideological "unconsciousness" (a glimpse of the real foundations of History, of ideology) for critique, is worthwhile.
So to get more directly at your question: can we meaningfully interpret texts when we can no longer historicize or classify by genre? I think we can, but only if we abandon any notion of a stable Truth to which a text can refer. In this way, we may be able use Spivak's rhetorically sensitive reading practice as a way, among others, to "rewrite" a text in meaningful terms that leave "referentiality" (to something outside itself) intact. This way, we can still say that a text can have meaning outside its internal structuring and logics.
This probably doesn't clarify things because it hasn't clarified for me yet, but wonderful post, Leanna! It was productive!
The debate over fiction/nonfiction/creative nonfiction is so fun to me. I quickly go toward a genre-relativism and find it hard to believe that it matters much whether something is fiction or nonfiction (if we can even determine what that means). It becomes important of course, when you're trying to situate something historically.
ReplyDeleteCan we apply historical/historicist theories to something that doesn't claim to comment or be a part of that history? Whether it wants to, it is, (things were written at a certain place and time regardless of if they claim that same situation) historical, and will reflect traces of that history.
Your comment about Hayok's successful method of accurately interpreting a text by "zooming and out viewing the passage in a fuller context" was well examined. He turns his point of trying to legitimize historicism by turning it into a philosophical method, and I don't think it's always applicable when doing research. There has to be a point in which, while acknowledging history will always have certain biases and is difficult to fully contextualize, there is an understanding that a text will have some level of fictionality. The best you can do is to take a broad approach to contextualization and try to take into account the circumstances that will affect it the most.
ReplyDeleteLeanna,
ReplyDeleteI'm so glad you brought up the issue of defining "non-fiction" in Greenblatt's and Hayot's texts for this week. I think that gets to the issue that Hayot picks up from Greenblatt: the concern with "real bodies" and "real pain," which, through a look at the tropes and stereotypes used in the anecdote, leads to Hayot's claim that "language too is real" (36).
After reading your post, I am now wondering how the "dark specificity" relates to "context" for Greenblatt. How does taking out this excerpt, this anecdote (and removing some of the context on either side), reinforce this "dark specificity"? Does Hayot's context draw away from or add to this specificity, or do something very different?